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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a movement of late to create a legal basis for ex-
empting churches from the Tax Code's restrictions on electioneer-
ing.' As it stands, churches2 may not participate at all in cam-
* J.D. 1975, University of Pittsburgh Law School; J.C.D. University of St. Thomas
Aquinas; Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. Dean
Cafardi would like to thank his research assistant, Matthew Orie, for his help with the
footnotes.
1. See, e.g., Keith S. Blair, Praying for a Tax Break: Churches, Political Speech and
the Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. 405 (2009); Chris
Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church
Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145 (2006); Lloyd. H. Mayer, Politics
at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 1137 (2009); Allan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences When Churches Participate in
Political Campaigns, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 145 (2007); Jennifer M. Smith, Morse Code,
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paigns for elective public office, neither on behalf of, nor in opposi-
tion to, a candidate. Part I of this article will examine the history
of this prohibition and the legal challenges to it. Then, Part II will
take up the idea of tax exemption as a taxpayer subsidy. Part III
will look at how the IRS has enforced this prohibition. Part IV
will conclude with some recommendations.
II. HISTORY
A. Origin of the Prohibition
The electioneering prohibition, not just for churches, but for all
organizations that get their exemption from federal income tax
under § 501(c)(3) of the Tax Code, is absolute and is rather long-
standing. It was initially added to the Code in 1954, when Con-
gress was revising the Tax Code, in an amendment from the floor
by then Texas Senator and minority leader Lyndon B. Johnson.3
Senator Johnson evidently believed that a Texas-based charitable
foundation had been helping his opponent in the 1954 Texas De-
mocratic primary election for U.S. Senator and wanted to put a
stop to it. Since the language that he added to § 501(c)(3) of the
Tax Code, granting 501(c)(3) status only to an organization "which
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of
any candidate for public office," has no clear legislative history, we
Da Vinci Code, Tax Code and ... Churches: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis of
Why Section 501(c)(3) Does Not Apply to Churches, 32 J.L. & POL. 41 (2007).
2. An explanation of terminology is appropriate at the outset. This article will use the
word "church" not just to refer to Christian places of worship, but as a figure of speech to
cover synagogues, mosques, temples, and so forth. This is not original with the author.
The IRS also uses the word church in a generic sense. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 1828, TAx GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdflp1828.pdf. In the
article's title, the word "electioneering" is as defined in NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN F.
CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT AND TAX ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 6.05 (2006) (cit-
ing Roberts Dairy Co. v. Comm'r, 195 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1952) and Am. Hardware & Equip.
Co. v. Comm'r, 202 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1953)) ("Electioneering is the participation in a politi-
cal campaign for elective office, either by endorsing and working on behalf of a candidate or
by campaigning against a particular candidate."). Also in the article's title, the word
'preacher" is another figure of speech, meant to refer to priests, bishops, pastors, ministers,
rabbis, imams and so on-in short, any person whose job it is to get up in a generic
"church" and lead the service, usually by "preaching" to the "church" assembly.
3. See NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN F. CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 189 (2d ed. 2008) ("The ban on electioneering was made part of the
1954 Tax Code at the motion of then Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas.").
504 Vol. 50
Church Electioneering
can only guess at Johnson's motives.4 One thing is rather clear,
however, namely that although churches as Section 501(c)(3) or-
ganizations were caught in Johnson's net, churches were not his
direct target. It is almost a happenstance that the electioneering
prohibition was placed on churches, but some, including this au-
thor, would say that it was a felicitous happenstance, one that
benefits churches more than they perhaps realize-a felix culpa, to
use a phrase that some theologians might understand.5
Since Johnson's time, the language of § 501(c)(3) has been al-
tered only once, by the Revenue Act of 1987, which added the par-
enthetical language "(or in opposition to)" to the statute, arguably
making the limitation on electioneering activity by a tax exempt
organization even stronger.6 At this point, Congress certainly
knew that these intensified § 501(c)(3) electioneering prohibitions
would affect churches, as well as all other § 501(c)(3) organizations
and made no attempt to exclude them.
Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3), as it currently reads, ex-
empts from federal income taxation:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the preven-
tion of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earn-
ings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)),
4. It has been suggested that Johnson's motives may not have been so personal, but
lacking a clear record, history will never know. See Kemmitt, supra note 1, at 153 (citing
Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and Collection Plate: Never the Twain Shall Meet? 1
PITT TAX REV. 35, 49-55 (2003)) ("The [alternative] theory disputes the notion that Johnson
acted out of political self-interest and suggests that, on the contrary, Johnson's proposal
was a response to an intemperate, alternative proposal motivated by anti-Communist sen-
timent in Congress.").
5. The phrase is from the Roman Catholic Easter Vigil Mass: "0 felix culpa quae
talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem," which translates to "[ol happy fault that
merited such and so great a Redeemer." The reference is that Adam's sin was a felix culpa,
a happy fault, since it caused Christ to come to redeem mankind. THE ENGLISH-LATIN
SACRAMENTARY FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 116 (1966).
6. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10711(a), 101
Stat. 1330, 1464.
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and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including
the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public office.7
Although Congress has not changed the language of § 501(c)(3)
since 1987, it also created, in 1987, a new penalty for § 501(c)(3)
organizations that violated the prohibition on electioneering, by
adding § 4955 to the Tax Code.' This section levies an excise tax,
based on the amount expended for the impermissible electioneer-
ing activity, on both the organization and the organization's man-
agers who approved the expenditure.9
7. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
8. § 10712, 101 Stat. at 1464.
9. I.R.C. § 4955 (2006) (added by § 10711(a), 101 Stat. at 1464) reads, in pertinent
part:
(a) Initial taxes.
(1) On the organization. There is hereby imposed on each political expenditure by
a section 501(c)(3) organization a tax equal to 10 percent of the amount thereof. The
tax imposed by this paragraph shall be paid by the organization.
(2) On the management. There is hereby imposed on the agreement of any organi-
zation manager to the making of any expenditure, knowing that it is a political ex-
penditure, a tax equal to 2 1/2 percent of the amount thereof, unless such agreement
is not willful and is due to reasonable cause. The tax imposed by this paragraph
shall be paid by any organization manager who agreed to the making of the expendi-
ture.
(d) Political expenditure. For purposes of this section-
(1) In general. The term "political expenditure" means any amount paid or in-
curred by a section 501(c)(3) organization in any participation in, or intervention in
(including the publication or distribution of statements), any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
(2) Certain other expenditures included. In the case of an organization which is
formed primarily for purposes of promoting the candidacy (or prospective candidacy)
of an individual for public office (or which is effectively controlled by a candidate or
prospective candidate and which is availed of primarily for such purposes), the term
"political expenditure" includes any of the following amounts paid or incurred by the
organization:
(A) Amounts paid or incurred to such individual for speeches or other services.
(B) Travel expenses of such individual.
(C) Expenses of conducting polls, surveys, or other studies, or preparing papers or
other materials, for use by such individual.
(D) Expenses of advertising, publicity, and fundraising for such individual.
(E) Any other expense which has the primary effect of promoting public recogni-
tion, or otherwise primarily accruing to the benefit, of such individual.
Church Electioneering
B. Constitutional Challenges
Johnson's language in the Internal Revenue Code denying tax
exempt status to organizations that are electorally active0 has
survived constitutional challenge in numerous instances, because
exemption from taxation is a privilege, not a right, and like any
government granted privilege, the government is free to put le-
gitimate conditions on the grant of the privilege. The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals explained in Christian Echoes National Min-
istry, Inc. v. United States, where a religious organization, operat-
ing much like a church, claimed that the Tax Code's electioneering
restrictions violated its first amendment free speech rights:
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a matter
of grace rather than right, we hold that the limitations con-
tained in Section 501(c)(3) withholding exemption from non-
profit corporations do not deprive [taxpayer] of its constitu-
tionally guaranteed right of free speech. The taxpayer may
engage in all such activities without restraint, subject, how-
ever to withholding the exemption or, in the alternative, the
taxpayer may refrain from such activities and obtain the
privilege of exemption."
An alternative argument that a church has a first amendment
free exercise right to tax exemption is also a non-starter, since it
runs smack up against the Establishment Clause. As the U.S.
Supreme Court said in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, a case which
struck down as unconstitutional a state sales tax scheme that ex-
empted from the tax "[periodicals [that are] published or distrib-
uted by a religious faith [and that] consist wholly of writings
promulgating the teaching of the faith and books [that] consist
wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith:"12
In proscribing all laws "respecting an establishment of relig-
ion," the Constitution prohibits, at the very least, legislation
that constitutes an endorsement of one or another set of reli-
10. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) also contains a prohibition, but not a complete prohibition, on
lobbying activities by (c)(3) organizations. It specifies that "no substantial part of the ac-
tivities of [a 501(c)(3) organization can consist ofil carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation." Id. (emphasis added). The lobbying activities of
churches are not dealt with in this article.
11. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir.
1972).
12. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 1 (1989) (citations omitted).
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gious beliefs or of religion generally. It is part of our settled
jurisprudence that "the Establishment Clause prohibits gov-
ernment from abandoning secular purposes in order to put an
imprimatur on one religion, or on religion as such. ..
And:
[N]othing in our decisions under the Free Exercise Clause
prevents the State from eliminating altogether its exemption
for religious publications. "It is virtually self-evident that the
Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a
governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the
program actually burdens the claimant's freedom to exercise
religious rights.". . . The State therefore cannot claim persua-
sively that its tax exemption is compelled by the Free Exer-
cise Clause in even a single instance, let alone in every case.
No concrete need to accommodate religious activity has been
shown."'
C. The Effect of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA")'" in response to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Employment Division v. Smith,6 which undid the "compelling
state interest" test when dealing with a "neutral law of general
applicability."17 The "compelling state interest" test is derived
from the case of Sherbert v. Verner,"5 which held that "governmen-
13. Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 8 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 18 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Washington, 672 F. Supp.
167 (M.D. Pa. 1987), where the court said:
To violate the free exercise clause, the government must burden the defendant's prac-
tice of his religion by pressuring him to commit an act forbidden by the religion or by
preventing him from engaging in conduct that the faith mandates. The burden must
be more than an inconvenience and must interfere with a tenet or belief that is cen-
tral to religious doctrine. It is clear that the Internal Revenue Code does not have
that effect. A statute is not invalid simply because it affects a religious organization's
operation. The fact that, because of income taxes, the church will receive less money
does not rise to the level of a burden on the defendant's ability to exercise his reli-
gious beliefs. He may continue to donate the whole of his net income to the church
and may continue to worship according to the dictates of his heart. Thus, we reject
the defendant's free exercise defense.
Id. at 170 (citations omitted).
15. Pub L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2006)).
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citations omitted).
18. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Vol. 50
Church Electioneering
tal actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest."9 Smith held
that this test should no longer be used to protect religiously-
motivated persons from neutral laws of general applicability, say-
ing:
[The compelling state interest rule] would open the prospect
of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic
obligations of almost every conceivable kind-ranging from
compulsory military service, to the payment of taxes, to
health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child
neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and
traffic laws, to social welfare legislation such as minimum
wage laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environ-
mental protection laws, and laws providing for equality of op-
portunity for the races. The First Amendment's protection of
religious liberty does not require this."
Note that "payment of taxes" is included in the Court's list of neu-
tral laws of general applicability.
The legislative history of RFRA confirms that its purpose was to
return to the pre-Smith law, when Sherbert's compelling state in-
terest test was the controlling legal standard.2' The senate report
on the draft legislation states that in interpreting RFRA, courts
should rely on "free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guid-
ance in determining whether the exercise of religion has been sub-
stantially burdened and the least restrictive means have been em-
ployed in furthering a compelling governmental interest."22 In this
regard, the senate report specifically cites two pre-Smith tax
2 21cases, United States v. Lee23 and Hernandez v. Commissioner, on
whose jurisprudence the courts should rely to interpret RFRA.25
As one scholar has explained:
19. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 888-89 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
21. The Senate Report says that "Congress also determines that the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division v. Smith eliminated the compelling interest test for
evaluating free exercise claims previously set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, and that it is unnecessary to restore that test to reserve religious freedom." S. REP.
No. 103-111, at 14 (1993).
22. S. REP. No. 103-111, at 8-9.
23. 455 U.S. 252 (1983).
24. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
25. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 8-9.
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The legislative history shows that Congress sought to restore
the "compelling governmental interest test" that it believed
Smith had incorrectly eliminated for laws of general applica-
tion that burdened religion. That history provides that Con-
gress expected "that the courts will look to free exercise of re-
ligion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determin-
ing whether or not ... the least restrictive means have been
employed in furthering a compelling governmental interest"
and that the compelling interest test "generally should not be
construed more stringently or more leniently that it was prior
to Smith."
26
In the two U.S. Supreme Court cases referenced in the legisla-
tive history of the RFRA, Lee and Hernandez, the Court held that
the maintenance of a uniform system of taxation is a compelling
governmental interest. 7  In Lee, a member of the Old Order
Amish, who had employed several other Old Order Amish to work
on his farm, had failed to withhold their social security tax or to
pay the employer's portion thereof." He did this, he said, based on
his religion, which "not only prohibits the acceptance of social se-
curity benefits, but also bars all contributions by the Amish to the
social security system."2 9 There was no doubt about Lee's hon-
estly-held religious belief as to the social security system,30 but
applying the principle that "[t]he state may justify a limitation on
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an
overriding governmental interest[,I"3' the Court found the
"[g]overnment's interest in assuring mandatory and continuous
participation in and contribution to the social security system [to
be] very high"2 and that accommodating Lee's religious beliefs in
this regard would "unduly interfere with fulfillment of the gov-
ernmental interest."
33
26. Mayer, supra note 1, at 1179, cites H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6-7 (1993) and S. REP.
No. 103-111, at 8-9 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897-98, to support his
conclusion. Mayer, however, does not share my conclusion that RFRA did no more than
restore the "compelling state interest test" from Sherbert.
27. Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-59; Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699-700 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at
260).
28. Lee, 455 U.S. at 254.
29. Id. at 255.
30. Id. at 257.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 258-59.
33. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259.
510 Vol. 50
Church Electioneering
In Hernandez, the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether pay-
ments made to the Church of Scientology by its members for au-
diting and training sessions qualified as tax deductible charitable
contributions under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code.34 The
deductibility of these payments had been denied by the IRS,35 the
Tax Court,36 and several Circuit Courts of Appeals." Through au-
diting sessions, which are conducted by an auditor using an elec-
tronic device called an E-meter, new adherents to Scientology be-
come aware of the spiritual being that Scientology teaches exists
in every person.38 In training sessions, Scientologists who have
been through the auditing process learn additional church doc-
trine and qualify as auditors themselves. 39 The church charged a
fixed fee structure for these auditing and training sessions, 40 and
while a five percent discount was available for prepayment of
these charges,41 the fees were never waived,42 even for poorer
members of the church.43 This was due to the church's doctrine of
exchange "according to which any time a person receives some-
thing he must pay something back."44
The IRS's position on the deductibility of a Scientologist's pay-
ments to the church for auditing and training sessions was that it
represented a quid pro quo and so did not qualify "as a voluntary
transfer of property by the owner to another without consideration
therefor[,]" which is the definition of a gift, charitable or other-
wise. The taxpayers, who had paid for auditing and training ses-
sions and wished to treat their payments as tax deductible gifts to
the church, argued that "a quid pro quo analysis is inappropriate
under [§1 170 when the benefit a taxpayer receives is purely reli-
gious in nature." " While the taxpayers' claims had establish-ment47 and religious discrimination4" aspects, which the Court
34. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 683-84 (1989); 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006).
35. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 686.
36. Graham v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 575 (1984).
37. Hernandez v. Comm'r, 819 F.2d 1212, 1218 (1st Cir. 1987), affd, 490 U.S. 680
(1987); Graham v. Comm'r, 822 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1987), affd sub nom. Hernandez v.
Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
38. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 684-85.
39. Id. at 685.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 686.
42. Graham v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 575, 577 n.6 (1984).
43. Id.
44. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 685 (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 687 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 692 (emphasis omitted).
47. Id. at 695.
Summer 2012
Duquesne Law Review
dismissed after a thorough analysis,49 for purposes of this article,
their free exercise claim is paramount.
The taxpayers claimed that "disallowance of their [§] 170 deduc-
tions violates their right to the free exercise of religion by 'placing
a heavy burden on the central practice of Scientology.'"' ° While
implying, but not deciding, that the denial of a § 170 tax deduction
did not impose a substantial burden on the practice of Scientology,
the Court cited Lee for the governing principle that "even a sub-
stantial burden would be justified by the 'broad public interest in
maintaining a sound tax system,' free of 'myriad exceptions flow-
ing from a wide variety of religious beliefs."'' Once this becomes
the governing principle, of course, the taxpayer loses.
The suggestion has been made that the proper government in-
terest to analyze in the electioneering prohibition, however, is not
the overall maintenance of a uniform system of taxation, but
rather, the availability to churches of tax deductible gifts under
the Tax Code, which interest is "significantly attenuated because
most donors probably do not deduct their contributions."52 Obvi-
ously, the lesser the government interest, the more accommodat-
ing the government should be under the Sherbert test restored by
RFRA.
In the Tax Code's prohibition of church electioneering, however,
there is a higher governmental interest involved than the need to
police tax deductible gifts or even to maintain a uniform tax sys-
tem. That much higher governmental interest is the separation of
church and state. Allowing preachers to use tax subsidized funds
to deliver a partisan electioneering message is the type of clear
government endorsement of religion that the First Amendment
prohibits.5' This is Jefferson's wall of separation, and it is difficult
to think of a higher or more compelling government interest to
protect.54
48. Id. at 700.
49. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 695-98, 700-03.
50. Id. at 698 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 47, Hernandez, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (No.
87-963, 87-1616)).
51. Id. at 699-700 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1983)).
52. Mayer, supra note 1, at 1184.
53. Recognition of an organization's ability to attract tax deductible gifts under I.R.C. §
170 (2006) marks that organization as "Government Approved." See McGlotten v. Con-
nally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972).
54. In detailing the history of the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has ex-
plained:
Of this [Constitutional] convention Mr. Jefferson was not a member, he being then
absent as minister to France. As soon as he saw the draft of the Constitution pro-
Vol. 50512
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It has also been argued that RFRA has changed the previously
discussed constitutional jurisprudence on a church's free exercise
rights, and that "requiring the courts to apply the SherbertlYoder
balancing test in the tax context would require the government to
introduce evidence and to prove that a tax provision represents
the least-restrictive means of advancing a compelling government
interest."" The validity of that argument, however, is not borne
out by the post-RFRA cases. Let's examine these cases in chrono-
logical order.
In the case of Droz v. Commissioner," the taxpayer, Martin Droz
sought exception from payment of the self-employment Social Se-
curity tax on the ground that such payments violated his sincerely
held religious beliefs." The Tax Court had already upheld the
Commissioner's determination of a tax deficiency.58 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit pointed out that, in re-
gard to Droz's free exercise claim, it was applying RFRA, which
"restored the 'compelling interest' and 'least restrictive means'
tests.., used to consider free exercise challenges before Smith...
"59 The court went on to say that, as a result of RFRA, it was rely-
posed for adoption, he, in a letter to a friend, expressed his disappointment at the ab-
sence of an express declaration insuring the freedom of religion, but was willing to
accept it as it was, trusting that the good sense and honest intentions of the people
would bring about the necessary alterations. Five of the States, while adopting the
Constitution, proposed amendments. Three-New Hampshire, New York, and Vir-
ginia-included in one form or another a declaration of religious freedom in the
changes they desired to have made, as did also North Carolina, where the convention
at first declined to ratify the Constitution until the proposed amendments were acted
upon. Accordingly, at the first session of the first Congress the amendment now un-
der consideration was proposed with others by Mr. Madison. It met the views of the
advocates of religious freedom, and was adopted. Mr. Jefferson afterwards, in reply
to an address to him by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, took occa-
sion to say: 'Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that
the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,-I con-
template with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which de-
clared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation be-
tween church and State....' Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the
advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration
of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-64 (1878) (citations omitted).
55. Michelle O'Connor, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Exactly What Rights
Does It "Restore" in the Federal Tax Context?, 36 ARiz. ST. L.J. 321, 377 (2004) (footnote
omitted).
56. 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995).
57. Droz, 48 F.3d at 1121.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1122 n.2 (citations omitted).
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ing on pre-Smith decisions under the Free Exercise Clause, and
that the controlling case in this arena was United States v. Lee,
which was also a religiously based Social Security non-payment
case.6' Lee, the Ninth Circuit said, held that "the government had
a compelling interest in enforcing participation in the Social Secu-
rity system in order to insure the 'fiscal vitality' of [the] system..
S.,,6 and that "this compelling interest.., outweighed the burden
that participation placed on [the taxpayer's] religious beliefs."62 In
addition, the Ninth Circuit, again citing Lee, found that the nar-
row exception that Congress had carved out of the Social Security
tax for self-employed members of a church which had a long-
standing practice of providing for its dependent members63 "was
narrowly tailored to meet the government's objective ... ,64 In a
long quote from Lee, in what is now post-RFRA jurisprudence, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out that:
The tax system could not function if denominations were al-
lowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were
spent in a manner that violates their religious beliefs. Be-
cause the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax
system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with
the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.
6
In a minor case that referenced RFRA, Steckler v. United
States,6 the taxpayer claimed that the government's requirement
that he provide a social security number when he redeemed his
treasury bonds or be subject to automatic withholding violated his
religious beliefs. In dealing with the plaintiffs "not particularly
well articulated claims ,68 the court did consider RFRA's applica-
tion to the case but found that "RFRA reflected a stricter standard
developed in the jurisprudence: a governmental action may sub-
stantially burden an individual's free exercise of religion only if
the government demonstrates that the action furthers a compel-
ling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
60. Id. at 1122-23.
61. Id. at 1123 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1982)).
62. Droz, 48 F.3d at 1123 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 260-61).
63. I.R.C. § 1402(g) (2006).
64. Droz, 48 F.3d at 1123 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 259-60).
65. Id. (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 259-60).
66. No. 96-1054, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 722 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 1998).




furthering that interest." 9 Lacking any coherent argument contra
by the plaintiff, the court found that "the government's interest in
collecting taxes fairly, in administering its tax system properly,
and in making sure all citizens participate in that system on equal
terms is compelling."" The court went on to find, on the central
issue of whether automatic withholding was the least restrictive
way for the government to accomplish this interest and again
lacking any coherent argument contra by the plaintiff,7'1 that it
was.
72
In the case of Packard v. United States,3 the taxpayer was suing
to recover automatic penalties collected by the IRS on her failure
to pay her federal income taxes, due to her sincerely held Quaker
beliefs in opposition to war which, she claimed, her income taxes
were funding.74 The taxpayer relied on the language of RFRA
which says that the "[g]overnment may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that applica-
tion of the burden to that person (1) is in furtherance of a compel-
ling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest."75  Specifi-
cally, she argued that her case could not be decided on the gov-
ernment's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, because
the cited language of RFRA required the government to demon-
strate facts (i.e., that automatic penalties were the least restric-
tive means to enforce her non-payment of income taxes) at trial.76
The district court disagreed, saying:
To the extent that plaintiff has claimed that the RFRA sup-
ports her suit for return of penalties already collected, it is
her burden to establish either that the assessment of such
penalties was not a compelling government interest or that it
was not the least restrictive means of furthering that Gov-
ernment interest.7
69. Id. at *7.
70. Id. at *9 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-60).
71. Id.
72. Steckler, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 722, at *9.
73. 7 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Conn. 1998), aff'd, 1999 WL 500797 (2d Cir. June 1, 1999).
74. Packard, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
75. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 146.
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The court went on to hold that there was a compelling government
interest in collecting taxes78 and that the plaintiffs argument that
there were less restrictive ways for the government to collect un-
paid taxes than to impose a penalty, for example, by levying
against her assets "would be opening [a] Pandora's Box to tax eva-
sion because, in effect, plaintiffs argument says to all who will not
pay taxes for religious, philosophical, moral, or other reasons that
the Government must first levy before imposing a penalty. We
refuse to accept such an impractical and unworkable system."79
Similarly, in Adams v. Commissioner," Priscilla Lippincott Ad-
ams had refused to pay her federal income taxes on the basis of
her sincerely held Quaker religious beliefs that to fund the mili-
tary was against the will of God.8' She was appealing a Tax Court
determination that she "was not exempt from the payment of
taxes under RFRA and was liable for the deficiencies and penal-
ties assessed against her, relying on United States v. Lee and other
case law preceding Employment Division v. Smith."82 The tax-
payer conceded that the government had a compelling interest in
collecting her taxes, but as in Packard, the taxpayer was arguing
that, after RFRA, the government had "the burden.., of proving
that it could not accommodate her, that is, there [was] no less re-
strictive means of furthering the government's interest."8  She
had suggested, for example, that the government could direct her
,,84
taxes "to a fund that supported only non-military spending ....
Since the Tax Court had not required such proof, she was appeal-
ing its judgment.85
The Third Circuit did an extensive evaluation of the legislative
history of RFRA.86 It understood that "[i]n enacting RFRA, Con-
gress specifically announced its intent to 'restore' the 'compelling
interest' test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder . . . ,,8' The Third Circuit noted that, "[wihile prior cases
touched on one or more of the aspects of the RFRA test, these ele-
ments-substantial burden, compelling interest, least restrictive
78. Id.
79. Packard, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 146-47.
80. 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
81. Adams, 170 F.3d at 174.




86. Adams, 170 F.3d at 176-78.
87. Id. at 176.
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means-did not constitute a comprehensive standard, let alone a
uniform or established test, prior to Smith."88 Nonetheless, after
examining RFRA's legislative history and the prior case law it
sought to restore, the Third Circuit found that:
Viewing the requirements of RFRA through the helpful lens
of pre-Smith case law, we conclude that the nature of the
compelling interest involved-as characterized by the Su-
preme Court in Lee-converts the least restrictive means in-
quiry into a rhetorical question that has been answered by
the analysis in Lee. The least restrictive means of furthering
a compelling interest in the collection of taxes ... is in fact, to
implement that system in a uniform, mandatory way, with
Congress determining in the first instance if exemptions are
to built [sic] into the legislative scheme. The question of
whether government could implement a less restrictive means
of income tax collection surfaced in pre-Smith case law and
was answered in the negative based on the practical need of
the government for uniform administration of taxation, given
particularly difficult problems with administration should ex-
ceptions on religious grounds be carved out by the courts.8
Once the Third Circuit established this governing principle from
the legislative history of RFRA and the prior case law, it had no
trouble reaching its holding: "[iun sum, we find that the Tax Court
engaged in an appropriate analysis of [taxpayer's] RFRA claim
based upon United States v. Lee, and that that [the government]
was not required to produce evidence under the 'least restrictive
means' prong of RFRA in order to prevail."9 °
The case of Browne v. United States9 involved yet other Quaker
taxpayers, Gordon and Edith Browne, who had refused to pay that
portion of the income tax which they had calculated went to sup-
port the Department of Defense.92 They had lost at the district
court level on a final judgment on the pleadings and had appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.93 As the Second
Circuit described their claim on appeal, "[r]elying on RFRA and
88. Id. (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 179 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1983)).
90. Id. at 180.
91. 176 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1999).
92. Browne, 176 F.3d at 26.




the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of religion, the
Brownes contend that the IRS must allow them to withhold a por-
tion of their taxes and then collect it by levy without charging in-
terest or a penalty."" This is basically the same argument that
the taxpayer had made in the Packard case. As a matter of fact,
the opinion of the district court in Packard had cited the district
court in Browne to the effect that:
Allowing individuals like the plaintiffs to withhold a portion
of their due taxes would encourage chaos in that every indi-
vidual with an objection to a particular governmental expen-
diture would be able to unilaterally impose additional, time-
consuming administrative burdens on the IRS. Furthermore,
acceptance of the plaintiffs' arguments would encourage more
governmental involvement in religious matters in that the
IRS would be required to assess the genuineness of each tax
protester's religious beliefs. Finally, it is difficult to imagine a
means of compliance with the tax laws which is less restric-
tive than the voluntary compliance to which the plaintiffs ob-
ject."
In an ironic swipe, the Second Circuit, citing Employment Division
v. Smith, held that the Brownes' First Amendment claim failed
"because they are required to comply with the tax laws despite
religious-based disagreement with the allocation of certain
funds."96 As to their RFRA claim, that "must also fail because vol-
untary compliance is the least restrictive means by which the IRS
furthers the compelling governmental interest in uniform, manda-
tory participation in the federal income tax system."97
In a case mentioned later in this article on how the IRS has po-
liced churches' electioneering activities,98 Branch Ministries v.
Rossotti,99 the church raised a RFRA defense in the face of the
IRS's revocation of its tax exempt status because of its electioneer-
ing activities. ' Because the language of RFRA requires a sub-
stantial burden on free exercise rights before RFRA's protections
94. Browne, 176 F.3d at 26.
95. 7 F. Supp. 2d 143, 147 (D. Conn. 1998) (citation omitted) (quoting Browne, 22 F.
Supp. 2d at 313), affd, 1999 WL 500797 (2d Cir. June 1, 1999).
96. Browne, 176 F.3d at 26.
97. Id. (citation omitted).
98. See infra Part IV.A.
99. 40 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, 211 F.3d 137 (2000).
100. Branch Ministries, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
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kick in,'01 the court said, "[i]f, and only if, plaintiffs can demon-
strate a substantial burden, then the government has the burden
under RFRA of establishing that the revocation [of tax exempt
status] serves a compelling governmental interest and that revo-
cation is the least restrictive means of accomplishing that compel-
ling interest." 1 2 In a devastating deconstruction of the alleged
burden on the church's free exercise, the court basically says,
' Your only loss is the money that you are using for non-religious
purposes." The court states that:
As an initial matter, plaintiffs have failed to establish that
the revocation of the Church's Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
status substantially burdened its right to freely exercise its
religion. A substantial burden exists where the government
put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his be-
havior and to violate his beliefs, or where the government
forces an individual to choose between following the precepts
of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion. Plaintiffs have
provided no evidence that the revocation of Section 501(c)(3)
status by the IRS was in any way connected to plaintiffs' re-
fusal to violate their religious beliefs or abandon a precept of
their religion. Instead, the revocation was undertaken be-
cause of plaintiffs' involvement in partisan political activity..
In fact, the only way in which the revocation of Section
501(c)(3) status has had any effect on plaintiffs' exercise of re-
ligion is that the Church may now have less operating money
to spend on religious activities because it is a taxable entity.
The fact that plaintiffs may now have less money to spend on
their religious activities as a result of their participation in
partisan political activity, however, is insufficient to establish
a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion."3
And of course, why should money for electioneering purposes be
important to the churches, except for the earthly power that it
gives their preachers in helping to slant elections for public office?
There is something extremely wrong with that syllogism, and it
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
102. Branch Ministries, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 25 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Summer 2012 519
Duquesne Law Review
seems that the courts and the IRS understand the true purpose of
a church better than the churches do. But the court in Branch
Ministries did not limit itself to the above observation. It also
dealt with the government's compelling interest in preventing tax
exempt organizations from using taxpayer subsidized dollars for
electioneering purposes:
Even if plaintiffs could establish a substantial burden, the
government has met the compelling interest standard. The
government has a compelling interest in maintaining the in-
tegrity of the tax system and in not subsidizing partisan po-
litical activity, and Section 501(c)(3) is the least restrictive
means of accomplishing that purpose. Plaintiffs therefore
cannot prevail on their free exercise claims. 14
Note that last part. As I explained earlier, there is a higher com-
pelling governmental interest at stake in these cases than the
need to police tax deductible gifts or even the need to maintain a
uniform tax system. That much higher governmental interest is
the separation of church and state, as the court in Branch Minis-
tries recognized.
In United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple,' the church
("IBT") argued that it was exempt from the federal employment
tax laws, due to its belief that it was a sin for the church to pay
taxes. 6 IBT had lost at the district court level on summary judg-
ment 7 and was now appealing to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.0 8 In applying RFRA (the constitutionality of
which the court noted even "as applied to the federal government
is not without doubt" 9) the court said:
IBT proceeds as though [RFRAI somehow overturned the Su-
preme Court's decision in Smith-that neutral laws of general
application cannot be attacked on Free Exercise grounds-
and reinstated the pre-Smith standards for evaluating Free
Exercise challenges. RFRA did not (and could not) do this.
RFRA simply established an independent statutory regime
104. Id. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
105. 224 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2000).
106. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d at 628.
107. United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 61 F. Supp. 2d 836, 837 (1999), affd,
224 F.3d 627 (2000).
108. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d at 627.
109. Id. at 629 n..
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essentially prohibiting the enforcement of laws that cannot
satisfy the pre-Smith standards.
Even if IBT's misguided attempts to invoke RFRA as a consti-
tutional standard are construed generously as an effort to
seek relief on statutory grounds, IBT's challenge to the federal
employment tax laws must still be rejected. Under RFRA,
laws that substantially burden the free exercise of religion
cannot be enforced unless the burden furthers a compelling
government interest and is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that interest. In several pre-Smith Free Exercise
challenges to the application of federal tax laws, the Supreme
Court and various courts of appeals concluded both that
maintaining a sound and efficient tax system is a compelling
government interest and that the difficulties inherent in ad-
ministering a tax system riddled with judicial exceptions for
religious employers make a uniformly applicable tax system
the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The
cases that have been decided under RFRA reach the same
conclusion. We find this authority persuasive and see no rea-
son to reach a different conclusion.'1 °
In United States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious
Society of Friends,'" the Yearly Meeting was sued by the govern-
ment for its refusal to honor a levy on the wages of its employee,
Priscilla Lippincott Adams. 112 This was the same Adams who had
litigated and lost Adams v. Commissioner,"' described above. The
Yearly Meeting argued that RFRA prevented the IRS from mak-
ing the Yearly Meeting cooperate in the collection of Ms. Adams's
back taxes."' Also at issue was a fifty percent penalty that the
IRS had assessed against the Yearly Meeting for its failure to
honor the IRS's levy on Ms. Adams's wages." 5
The district court did find that the levy and the penalty sub-
stantially burdened the Yearly Meeting within the meaning of
RFRA, in that it placed serious pressure on the Yearly Meeting to
abandon its religiously based support for Ms. Adams's position
that to fund the military through her taxes was against the will of
110. Id. at 629-30 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
111. 322 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
112. Phila. Yearly Meeting, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 604-05.
113. 170 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
114. Phila. Yearly Meeting, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
115. Id. This penalty is created by I.R.C. § 6332(d)(2) (2006).
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God." 6 Since the Yearly Meeting had established a substantial
burden on its free exercise rights, the court said that "the burden
shifts to the Government to show that enforcement of the levy fur-
thers a compelling interest by the least restrictive means.
The government argued that, under Adams, it need not demon-
strate that the levy furthered a compelling interest. 118 The district
court refused to give Adams that effect, saying, "the precise nature
of the Government's 'compelling interest' in these [levy] powers is
an issue of first impression.""9 The court then performed a per-
functory review of cases interpreting § 6332 of the Tax Code, 2°
which it said were condensed in the holding of United States v.
National Bank of Commerce12' as follows:
The underlying principle justifying the administrative levy is
the need of the government promptly to secure its revenues.
Indeed, one may readily acknowledge that the existence of the
levy power is an essential part of our self-assessment tax sys-
tem, for it enhances voluntary compliance in the collection of
taxes. Among the advantages of the administrative levy is
that it is quick and relatively inexpensive. 1
22
Having established the government's compelling interest in a
wage levy on an employer of a tax delinquent as a way of quickly
and inexpensively discharging a tax deficiency, the district court
then turned to whether the wage levy was the least restrictive
means of achieving the government's interest.123 On this point, the
Yearly Meeting argued that the government did not discharge its
burden, because there were two other ways of getting its tax
money from Adams, neither one of which involved a wage levy: (1)
it could have honored the Yearly Meeting's policy of withholding
taxes from its employees who did not wish to pay federal income
taxes and placed them in a separate account subject to the gov-
ernment's levy; or (2) the government could have located and lev-
ied other property of Ms. Adams.124
116. Phila. Yearly Meeting, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 608-09.
117. Id. at 609.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 610.
120. I.R.C. § 6332 (2006).
121. 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
122. Phila. Yearly Meeting, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (quoting Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472
U.S. at 721).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 610-11.
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For numerous reasons, the district court found these sugges-
tions either impossible or impractical.' While hedging its analy-
sis by saying, "[w]e ... acknowledge that RFRA might have re-
quired a different result" if the Yearly Meeting's suggested alter-
natives to a wage levy had been possible, the court concluded that
"on the record actually before us . . . the levy on Ms. Adams's
wages was the least restrictive means of achieving the Govern-
ment's compelling interest in satisfying her tax delinquency."'26
However, the court did throw out the fifty percent penalty that the
government had laid on the Yearly Meeting on the grounds that:
(1) the regulation implementing I.R.C. § 6332(d)(2) says that the
penalty should not apply where a bona fide dispute exists concern-
ing the legal effectiveness of the levy'27 and (2) that the Yearly
Meeting had "raised novel and important questions about the
reach of RFRA in the aftermath of Adams.
1 28
Each of these post-RFRA cases, in which the federal courts have
heard a RFRA challenge to a taxing statute, have relied on the
reasoning of United States v. Lee, 129 which was cited in the legisla-
tive history of RFRA for the principle that the government's inter-
est in maintaining a uniform tax system is so high that any al-
leged free exercise right must fall before it.'3 ° Importantly, the
Branch Ministries case, at least when it comes to the Tax Code's
prohibition on electoral speech by § 501(c)(3)131 churches, recog-
nizes an even more compelling governmental interest--one pre-
sent at the founding of our country and fundamentally basic to
it-the separation of church and state.'32
D. Ongoing Constitutional Analysis
The recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Snyder v. Phelps, ' ap-
pears to put another nail in the argument that churches have
First Amendment religious freedom rights that somehow make
their speech more privileged than that of other organizations. In
125. Id.
126. Id. at 612.
127. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6332-1(b)(2) (2006); Phila. Yearly Meeting, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 612-
13.
128. Phila. Yearly Meeting, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
129. 455 U.S. 252 (1983).
130. See H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 4 n.13 (1993); S. REP. No. 103-111, at 4 n.5 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1894 n.5.
131. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
132. 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25-26 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, 211 F.3d 137 (2000).
133. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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the Snyder case, the Westboro Baptist Church was contesting a
federal district court verdict against it for $2.9 million in compen-
satory damages and $8 million in punitive damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil
conspiracy claims, resulting from its picketing of the funeral of
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who had died in Iraq.'34
Some of the picket signs said "God Hates the USA/Thank God for
9/11," "America is Doomed," "Don't Pray for the USA," "Thank God
for IEDs," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "God Hates Fags,"
"You're Going to Hell," and "God Hates You.
1 35
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the verdict against the
Westboro Baptist Church on free speech grounds:
Given that Westboro's speech was at a public place on a mat-
ter of public concern, that speech is entitled to "special protec-
tion" under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be re-
stricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.
"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amend-
ment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself of-
fensive or disagreeable. 36
This speech by the members of the Westboro Baptist Church was
unquestionably religiously motivated. As Chief Justice Roberts'
opinion states, "[tihe picket signs reflected the church's view that
the United States is overly tolerant of sin and that God kills
American soldiers as punishment .... The church's congregation
believes that God hates and punishes the United States for its tol-
erance of homosexuality, particularly in America's military."
137
The Westboro Baptist Church has, over the last twenty years,
picketed nearly six hundred military funerals. 13  So clearly the
church was demonstrating out of religious motivation.
Nevertheless, Snyder was not a free exercise case, but a free
speech case, thus showing that in matters of speech, including
electoral speech, religious liberty is protected by free speech, not
by free exercise. As Justice Scalia wrote in Smith:
134. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213-14.
135. Id. at 1213. Other picket signs carried messages that said "Pope in Hell" and
"Priests Rape Boys." Id. The anti-Catholic references were evidently thrown in because
Matthew Snyder's funeral was being held at a Catholic church. Id.
136. Id. at 1219 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).




The only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applica-
ble law to religiously motivated action have not involved the
Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press .... "'
This is an important distinction to make when considering the
churches' argument that they have a constitutional free exercise
right to intervene in elections that other § 501(c)(3) organizations
do not have. Churches have no such constitutional free exercise
right. At best, they could argue a free speech right, but if that
were the case, then non-church tax exempt organizations must
have exactly the same free speech right to endorse a candidate as
tax exempt churches do. However, this is not the churches' argu-
ment.
III. TAx EXEMPTION AS A SUBSIDY
Underlying the Courts' upholding of the electioneering restric-
tions on all 501(c)(3) organizations, including churches, is the
premise that these organizations operate on federal subsidy. As
early as 1933, the Brookings Institution wrote that:
Tax exemption, no matter what its form, is essentially a gov-
ernment grant or subsidy. Such grants would seem to be jus-
tified only if the purpose for which they are made is one for
which the legislative body would be equally willing to make a
direct appropriation from public funds equal to the amount of
the exemption. This test would not be met except in the case
where the exemption is granted to encourage certain activities
of private interests, which, if not thus performed, would have
to be assumed by the government at an expenditure at least
as great as the value of the exemption.4 °
This tax subsidy is provided to churches in two ways: (1) their
exemption from federal income taxation under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
and (2) their ability to attract tax deductible gifts under I.R.C. §
139. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (citations omitted).
140. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 709 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting BROOKINGS INST., REPORT ON A SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATION IN IOWA: THE
REVENUE SYSTEM 33 (1933)).
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170.14' As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington:
Both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of sub-
sidy that is administered through the tax system. A tax ex-
emption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the or-
ganization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its in-
come. Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of
the amount of a portion of the individual's contributions. The
system Congress has enacted provides this kind of subsidy to
nonprofit civic welfare organizations generally, and an addi-
tional subsidy to those charitable organizations that do not
engage in substantial lobbying. In short, Congress chose not
to subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize
other activities that nonprofit organizations undertake to
promote the public welfare."'
Some courts have described the situation as a trade-off of political
activity in exchange for the benefits of tax exemption:
[A]n understanding of two pertinent sections of the Code is
necessary, as a preliminary matter, to appreciate what is at
stake in this litigation. As noted, the Catholic Church and or-
ganizational plaintiffs ARM and NWHN are tax-exempt un-
der § 501(c)(3). That section states that qualifying religious
or civic public interest organizations need not pay federal
taxes. The trade-off for the benefit of this exemption is that
no substantial part of the organization's activities may in-
clude "carrying on . . .propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation ... [nor may it] participate in, or in-
tervene in (including the publishing or distributing of state-
ments), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for
public office." Thus, the quid pro quo for § 501(c)(3) tax-
exemption is a restraint on an organization's right to try to in-
fluence the political process. This limitation has been held
constitutional. Section 501(c)(3) status is advantageous to the
supporters of an organization as well as the organization it-
self because § 170 of the Code permits donors to § 501(c)(3)
entities to claim a deduction for their contributions. This de-
duction gives the donor an economic incentive to contribute.
141. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 170 (2006).
142. 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
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For example, a donor in a 28 percent tax bracket actually
pays only 72 cents for every dollar contributed to the Catholic
Church because of the deduction. Consequently, organiza-
tions like the Church and plaintiffs ARM and NWHN have
enhanced fundraising abilities because they are able to offer
donors the lure of the § 170 deduction.'
The implication of these decisions is very clear: if a § 501(c)(3)
organization, such as a church, accepts the tax subsidies of I.R.C.
§ 170 and 501(c)(3), then it is also bound by the restrictions that
the tax law carries with it-namely the inability to be politically
active, and specific to this article, the inability to electioneer on
behalf of or against a candidate for public office.
The gift sums being dealt with here are not insignificant. In
2010, the last year for which figures are available, churches and
religious organizations received $100.63 billion tax-deductible dol-
lars from U.S. taxpayers.'" That amount counts for thirty-five
percent of all charitable contributions in the U.S. for that year.145
This sum is available to the churches as a result of I.R.C. §§ 170
and 501(c)(3)' 4' and does not include other church income, e.g., en-
dowment or investment income, which is also untaxed under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and is thought to be many times annual gift in-
come. Exact numbers are impossible to come by, however, since
churches need not file the annual informational tax return, Form
990, with the federal government, which would list investment
income.' 47 This $100.63 billion dollar figure also does not include
the financial benefits to churches that tend to "piggyback" on their
federal tax exemption, such as exemption from state income taxes,
state sales and use taxes, and local property taxes. While the ex-
emption from federal income taxes granted by I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) to
churches does not automatically carry these ancillary benefits
with it, very often the requirements for these other state and local
tax exemption benefits are so similar to the § 501(c)(3) require-
143. In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1021-22 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted).
144. GIVING USA FOUND., GIVING USA 2011: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY
FOR THE YEAR 2010 6 (2011).
145. Id.
146. I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3) (2006).
147. I.R.C §§ 501(c)(3), 6033(a)(3)(A).
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ments that, if the church meets the federal requirements, it will
meet the state and local requirements as well.148
If one goes searching for a reason why churches should be tax
exempt, the answer does not lie in the fact that they are churches
and cannot be taxed under the First Amendment's guarantee of
free exercise. In fact, if churches were granted a federal tax ex-
emption simply because they were churches, the opposite might be
the case. This might be the endorsement of religion, which is pro-
hibited by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.9
Rather, churches are exempt from federal income taxation because
they are part of a larger group of organizations, listed in I.R.C. §
501(c)(3), that Congress has determined to be beneficial to society.
This is sometimes referred to as the "public benefit" theory."' A
scholar in the field described this theory as follows:
Since medieval times, certain activities rating high in the
scale of contemporary values have been accorded tax exemp-
tion. From the time when old world culture was first trans-
planted to America, charitable activities have been granted
various forms of tax favors. The basic motive for these tax fa-
vors has been a wish to encourage activities that were recog-
nized as inherently meritorious and conducive to the general
welfare. In some cases it was also true that the exempted or-
ganizations performed activities that the government would
otherwise be forced to undertake, but it is believed that gov-
ernmental saving has not been the decisive factor influencing
the exemption of charitable activities from tax."'
This explanation, at least as to charities that the Tax Code allows
to attract tax deductible gifts, was validated in McGlotten v. Con-
nally:152
The rationale for allowing the deduction of charitable contri-
butions has historically been that by doing so, the Govern-
ment relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs
148. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 667 n.1 (1970) (quoting N.Y.
TAX LAW § 420(1) (McKinney 1969).
149. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989).
150. CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 2, § 5.02.
151. Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organiza-
tions: Its History and Underlying Policy, in IV RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE
COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2025, 2039 (Judith G. Smith
ed., 1977).
152. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
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which in the absence of charitable activity would fall on the
shoulders of the Government. "The Government is compen-
sated for its loss of revenue by its relief from financial bur-
dens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations
from public funds."15
Perhaps the best validation of the public benefit justification for
the exemption of churches from local property taxes, as well as
federal taxes under § 501(c)(3), is in Walz:
The legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is nei-
ther the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is nei-
ther sponsorship nor hostility. New York, in common with
the other States, has determined that certain entities that ex-
ist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large,
and that foster its 'moral or mental improvement,' should not
be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the
hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes. It
has not singled out one particular church or religious group or
even churches as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all
houses of religious worship within a broad class of property
owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include
hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, his-
torical, and patriotic groups. The State has an affirmative
policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing
influences in community life and finds this classification use-
ful, desirable, and in the public interest.
154
Because the benefits that tax exempt organizations confer, or
are thought to confer on the public is the reason they are subsi-
dized by the tax laws, it makes sense that any of their activities
that do not contribute to the public benefit should not be subsi-
dized. Although he was dealing with the lobbying restriction and
not the electioneering restriction in Slee v. Commissioner,'55 Judge
Learned Hand's observation is apt here as well. "Political agita-
tion as such," Hand wrote, "is outside the statute, however inno-
cent the aim, though it adds nothing to dub it 'propaganda,' a po-
lemical word used to decry the publicity of the other side. Contro-
153. McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 456 (citation omitted).
154. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73.
155. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
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versies of that sort must be conducted without public subvention;
the Treasury stands aside from them."5 6
The basis for the tax exemption of churches is not that they are
churches (which would be an indefensible establishment of relig-
ion)," 7 but because they are members of a "broad class" of organi-
zations that the State "considers . . . as beneficial and stabilizing
influences in community life." 5 8 Consequently, their tax exempt
status confers no more rights on them, as for example the right to
intervene in elections, than it confers on other § 501(c)(3) organi-
zations, which proposition is supported by Snyder 9
IV. IRS POLICING OF THE CHURCH ELECTIONEERING PROHIBITION
A. Cases
Although the restriction against electioneering seems rigorous,
it has not been rigorously policed by the Internal Revenue Service.
In fact, since Johnson's addition to the statute, there have been
only two reported cases dealing with the loss of a church's or reli-
gious organization's tax exemption due to its electioneering. Both
cases are well known and egregious.
The first case, Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v.
United States,16' dates back to 1972. Although it is sometimes
cited as a "church" case, and although the organization sounds a
lot like a church, (for example, it had "Articles of Faith" and main-
tained a radio and television outreach ministry),161 the Christian
Echoes National Ministry is consistently referred to as a "religious
162organization" and not as a "church" in the reported decision.
These are different terms with different meanings. Churches re-
ceive many more tax benefits than religious organizations do.6'
Nevertheless, this religious organization did lose its tax exempt
status, both for improper levels of lobbying and for violating the
electioneering prohibition.1 64  As the Court of Appeals for the
156. Slee, 42 F.2d at 185.
157. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989).
158. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73.
159. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
160. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
161. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, 470 F.2d at 851.
162. See, e.g., id. at 854.
163. See CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 2, § 8.03(C), at 112.
164. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, 470 F.2d at 856.
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Tenth Circuit said regarding the organization's electioneering ac-
tivities:
In addition to influencing legislation, Christian Echoes inter-
vened in political campaigns. Generally it did not formally
endorse specific candidates for office but used its publications
and broadcasts to attack candidates and incumbents who
were considered too liberal. It attacked President Kennedy in
1961 and urged its followers to elect conservatives like Sena-
tor Strom Thurmond and Congressmen Bruce Alger and Page
Belcher. It urged followers to defeat Senator Fulbright and
attacked President Johnson and Senator Hubert Humphrey.
The annual convention endorsed Senator Barry Goldwater.
These attempts to elect or defeat certain political leaders re-
flected Christian Echoes' objective to change the composition
of the federal government.
6 5
The politicians mentioned are pretty much a "who's who" of 1960's
personalities, with the organization's slant being very much in
favor of the conservative side of the American political spectrum of
the times and against the left. While the district court had over-
turned the IRS's revocation of § 501(c)(3) tax exempt status as to
Christian Echoes,166 in what can most charitably be called a case of
"home-cooking," the Tenth Circuit had no trouble finding that the
political activities restrictions of § 501(c)(3)--no substantial lobby-
ing and no electioneering at all-had been violated by the organi-
zation, meriting its loss of tax exempt status.6
The second "church" case is more recent. In Branch Ministries
v. Rossotti,'68 the Church at Pierce Creek, doing business as
"Branch Ministries," placed full page ads in the Washington Times
and USA Today four days before the 1992 presidential election.'69
As the court describes it:
The advertisement proclaimed "Christian Beware. Do not put
the economy ahead of the Ten Commandments." It asserted
that Governor Clinton supported abortion on demand, homo-
sexuality and the distribution of condoms to teenagers in pub-
lic schools. The advertisement cited various Biblical passages
165. Id.
166. Id. at 853.
167. See id. at 856.
168. 40 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, 211 F.3d 137 (2000).
169. Branch Ministries, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
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and stated that "Bill Clinton is promoting policies that are in
rebellion to God's laws." It concluded with the question:
"How then can we vote for Bill Clinton?" At the bottom of the
advertisement, in fine print, was the following notice: "This
advertisement was co-sponsored by The Church at Pierce
Creek, Daniel J. Little, Senior Pastor, and by churches and
concerned Christians nationwide. Tax-deductible donations
for this advertisement gladly accepted. Make donations to:
The Church at Pierce Creek," and provided a mailing ad-
dress.'7 °
It was probably that last tweak--"[t]ax-deductible donations for
this advertisement gladly accepted"-that drew'the IRS's ire, and
rightly so. This was about as flagrant an act of prohibited elec-
tioneering as a purported § 501(c)(3) church could engage in. The
court had no trouble rejecting Branch Ministries rather strange
argument that the IRS could not revoke its tax exempt status
unless it first showed that Branch Ministries was not a bona fide
church.'7 ' The rather easy response to that was: you may be a
church, but unless you adhere to the restrictions of § 501(c)(3), you
are not a tax exempt church.172
B. Other IRS Policing Activities
After years of very light policing of the electioneering prohibi-
tion as to churches, and § 501(c)(3) organizations in general, the
IRS announced during the 2004 presidential campaign a "Politi-
cal Activities Compliance Initiative," or PACI."7' The purpose of
this initiative was "to promote compliance with the I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) prohibition against political campaign intervention by
reviewing and addressing allegations of political intervention ...
by tax exempt organizations on an expedited basis during the
2004 election year."'74 The program was referral driven, that is to
say the IRS did not go out looking for violations of the electioneer-
ing prohibition, but rather dealt with "allegations of political cam-
paign intervention by IRC § 501(c)(3) organizations referred to the
170. Id.
171. Id. at 20.
172. Id. at 21.
173. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINAL REPORT,
PROJECT 302, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/final-paci-report.pdf.
174. Id. at 1.
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IRS."'75 The standard that the IRS used for deciding whether to
investigate a complaint was "whether [the allegation] supports a
reasonable belief that the organization may have violated the pro-
hibition of § 501(c)(3) that it not participate in, or intervene in (in-
cluding the publishing or distribution of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.""'6 Any allegations involving churches were "conducted ac-
cording to the church tax inquiry and examination procedures of
IRC § 7611."'
7
Unsurprisingly, churches accounted for 47 of the 110 cases that
the IRS examined for the 2004 elections, constituting close to half
(forty-three percent) of the total.1 78  Of the forty-seven church
cases, as of the Final Report, forty had been closed.' 9 It was found
that churches had committed such violations as endorsing candi-
dates in church bulletins or inserts in church bulletins, that
church officials had made statements either endorsing or opposing
candidates during services, that candidates spoke at church func-
tions, and that churches had distributed biased voter guides.'
The IRS explained that none of its 2004 examinations resulted
in the revocation of an organization's tax exempt status, '81 al-
though one organization was assessed the § 4955 tax on political
expenditures.' 8 In other situations, the § 4955 penalty was not
imposed, because "the amount involved fell below internal toler-
ance levels."'83 Three cases, or eight percent of the church cases,
resulted in no change in status, and thirty-four cases, or eighty-
four percent, resulted in an IRS advisory only.'
The IRS also did a PACI for the 2006 mid-term elections.8 ' In
2006, the IRS received 237 referrals or allegations of improper
political activity by § 501(c)(3) organizations, and selected for ex-
amination 100 of those.' Of those 100, 44 were church cases.""
175. Id. at 2.
176. Id. at 3.
177. Id. at 2.
178. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 173, at 9.
179. Id. at 14.
180. Id. at 16.
181. Id. at 18.
182. Id. at 18 n.6.
183. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 173, at 18 n.6.
184. Id. at 21.
185. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2006 POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/2006paci report_5-30-07.pdf.
186. Id. at 3.
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The allegations of improper political activity were basically the
same as in 2004. Similar to 2004, there were no revocations and
most cases were closed with a written IRS advisory. 18 Although
the Director of Exempt Organizations announced in a letter dated
April 17, 2008 that the IRS would do a PACI for the 2008 elections
and that a report would be due by March 31, 2009,89 no such re-
port has issued.
That in itself is very interesting since a number of Christian
preachers went out of their way in the 2008 presidential election
to challenge the IRS's authority on this question. The Alliance
Defense Fund, a conservative Christian organization, organized
"Pulpit Freedom Sunday" on September 28, 2008, in which it re-
cruited thirty-three pastors to violate the Tax Code's ban on
church electioneering by endorsing candidates from the pulpit.'90
That number increased on "Pulpit Freedom Sunday" on Septem-
ber 27, 2009, when eighty-three churches participated.19' On Sep-
tember 26, 2010, the Alliance Defense Fund claimed that 100 pas-
tors participated in "Pulpit Freedom Sunday."'92 And for "Pulpit
Freedom Sunday" in 2011, the Alliance website listed 539 commit-
ted church participants.9 3 All but three of the churches listed in
the 2011 participant list are Protestant Christian, primarily con-
servative evangelical organizations.'
These pastors are obviously trying to goad the IRS into action,
in the hope that a test case will provide the Alliance Defense Fund
187. Id.
188. Id. at 5.
189. Letter from Lois G. Lerner, Director, Exempt Organizations, to Marsha Ramirez,
Director, Examinations, Rob Choi, Director, Rulings & Agreements, and Bobby Zarin, Di-
rector, Customer Education & Outreach (Apr. 17, 2008), (available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2008_paci-program-letter.pdf).
190. Julia Duin, Churches to Defy IRS on Sermons, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/27/churches-t-defy-irs-on-
sermonsPpage=all.
191. Participation in Second Annual Pulpit Freedom Sunday More than Doubles from
Last Year, ALLIANCE DEF. FUND (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://www.alliancedefensefund.orgfNews/PRDetail/3180.
192. ALLIANCE DEF. FUND, Pastors Ready for Third-Annual Pulpit Freedom Sunday on
Sept. 26, ALLIANCE ALERT (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.alliancealert.org/2010/09/23/pastors-
ready-for-third-annual-pulpit-freedom-sunday-on-sept-26/.
193. ALLIANCE DEF. FUND, Pulpit Freedom Sunday 2011 Church Participants, ALLIANCE
DEF. FUND MEDIA, http://www.adfmedia.orgfiles/PFS 2011ParticipantList.pdf (last
visited Feb. 9, 2012).
194. See id. The three exceptions are Catholic: the Oratory of St. Philip Neri in the
Diocese of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; St. Augustine Church, an independent, "Old Roman
Catholic" parish located in Fort Worth, Texas, and St. Mary Church in the Diocese of Peo-
ria, Illinois. Id. There are no Jewish temples or synagogues and no Islamic mosques on the
2011 list. See id.
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with the chance to challenge the long-settled constitutionality of
the language of § 501(c)(3), which prohibits tax exempt churches
from any electioneering.
C. The IRS's Lenient Approach
Yet there are some who would say that the IRS is already too
lenient on preachers and their political activities. Some good ex-
amples of the IRS's leniency appear in the Tax Guide for Churches
and Religious Organizations.9' In that publication, the IRS gives
four examples of what kind of electioneering is permissible and
what is not permissible for preachers acting as individuals.'96
Those examples are:
Example 1: Minister A is the minister of Church J, a section
501(c)(3) organization, and is well known in the community.
With their permission, Candidate T publishes a full-page ad
in the local newspaper listing five prominent ministers who
have personally endorsed Candidate T, including Minister A.
Minister A is identified in the ad as the minister of Church J.
The ad states, "Titles and affiliations of each individual are
provided for identification purposes only." The ad is paid for
by Candidate T's campaign committee. Since the ad was not
paid for by Church J, the ad is not otherwise in an official
publication of Church J, and the endorsement is made by
Minister A in a personal capacity, the ad does not constitute
political campaign intervention by Church j.197
Example 2: Minister B is the minister of Church K, a section
501(c)(3) organization, and is well known in the community.
Three weeks before the election, he attends a press conference
at Candidate V's campaign headquarters and states that
Candidate V should be reelected. Minister B does not say he
is speaking on behalf of Church K. His endorsement is re-
ported on the front page of the local newspaper and he is
identified in the article as the minister of Church K. Because
Minister B did not make the endorsement at an official
church function, in an official church publication or otherwise
use the church's assets, and did not state that he was speak-
195. See INTERNAL REvENUE SERV., supra note 2.
196. Id. at 7-8.
197. Id. at 7.
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ing as a representative of Church K, his actions do not consti-
tute political campaign intervention by Church K.' 9
Example 3: Minister C is the minister of Church I, a section
501(c)(3) organization. Church I publishes a monthly church
newsletter that is distributed to all church members. In each
issue, Minister C has a column titled "My Views." The month
before the election, Minister C states in the "My Views" col-
umn, "It is my personal opinion that Candidate U should be
reelected." For that one issue, Minister C pays from his per-
sonal funds the portion of the cost of the newsletter attribut-
able to the "My Views" column. Even though he paid part of
the cost of the newsletter, the newsletter is an official publica-
tion of the church. Because the endorsement appeared in an
official publication of Church I, it constitutes political cam-
paign intervention by Church 9
Example 4: Minister D is the minister of Church M, a section
501(c)(3) organization. During regular services of Church M
shortly before the election, Minister D preached on a number
of issues, including the importance of voting in the upcoming
election, and concluded by stating, "It is important that you
all do your duty in the election and vote for Candidate W."
Because Minister D's remarks indicating support for Candi-
date W were made during an official church service, they con-
stitute political campaign intervention by Church M.2°°
The circle limiting a preacher's prohibited electioneering activ-
ity, as drawn by the IRS, is very generous. It prohibits only those
electoral activities of the preacher that could be deemed "offi-
cial"-on behalf of the church.2"' In the first example, the
preacher, identifying himself/herself as a preacher, is able to pub-
licly endorse a candidate, as long as the church does not pay for
the ad.2' In the second, the preacher gets his/her name in the
newspaper, making an endorsement, but because it does not hap-
pen in church or at a church funded function, that is permissi-
198. Id.
199. Id. at 8.
200. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 2. There are other examples in this IRS
publication, but these four deal with the focus of this article-the specific activity of the
preacher himself/herself.




ble. °3 Only in examples three and four, where the preacher makes
his/her endorsement in an official church publication or during the
actual service, does the IRS draw a line and say "no.
2
01
The distinction that the IRS is drawing here is very clear. In
the first two examples, the preacher is acting in his/her individual
capacity, even though he/she is publicly identified as a preacher.
Thus, the electioneering activity is permissible. In the third and
fourth, the preacher is using a church platform-the newsletter
and the pulpit; hence, the electioneering activity is prohibited.
The difference is easy to see-what is said in the church bulletin,
what is said in the church pulpit-are tax-subsidized activites,
and our taxes should not be used to subsidize partisan electoral
activity, or, to quote Learned Hand, "[clontroversies of that sort
must be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands
aside from them."2 °5
Those who would say that the IRS was being too lenient point to
examples one and two above, which the IRS would allow under
current tax law, and would ask, when is a preacher, if he or she is
pronouncing in public, not a preacher and not acting for or on be-
half of the church that employs him or her? Can we even separate
a preacher's "unofficial" preaching (public pronouncements) from
his or her "official" preaching? As one scholar in the field has
written:
[T]he members of a church are often willing to accept author-
ity and thus are more amenable to guidance from leaders and
clergy. One consequence is that a minister or leader of the
church cannot speak unofficially. If the minister believes that
tenets of a religion suggest or require that adherents vote a
certain way, her communication of that conclusion to her con-
gregants has the authority of her position and learning. A
suggestion that the statement is unofficial will either trivial-
ize the message or be meaningless. In fact, the religious faith
may require that the moral lesson be articulated by persons
speaking in their capacity as church or religious leaders.0 6
Under this standard, even examples one and two above would
involve impermissible electioneering by the preacher, and that is a
203. Id.
204. Id. at 8.
205. Slee v. Comm'r, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930).
206. Samansky, supra note 1, at 154.
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much more acceptable result. When preachers speak in public,
they are still preaching to their church, and the electioneering
prohibition should apply.
D. Lack of Adequate Penalties
The biggest problem that the IRS has in policing the church
electioneering prohibition is the lack of adequate policing alterna-
tives, which may, in turn, explain the IRS's perceived leniency. At
present, the IRS has a choice of two different sanctions when a
preacher violates the electioneering prohibition. It can revoke the
church's 501(c)(3) status, which is the nuclear option, or it can im-
207pose the § 4955 excise taxes, which is the fly-swatter option.
There is nothing in between, and that is the problem. Sanctions
need to be created in the middle ground-ones that do not termi-
nate the organization's tax exempt status, but that make it highly
unlikely that similar breaches of the electioneering prohibition
will occur again. This would, of course, require Congressional ac-
tion, but given the increasing annual numbers in the Pulpit Free-
dom Sunday event, that action is overdue.
V. SAVING THE PREACHERS
A. What the Numbers Show
The very odd thing about preachers electioneering from the pul-
pit is that, as preachers insist more and more on this right, their
congregations turn them off more and more. Just before the first
Pulpit Freedom Sunday in 2008, the Pew Research Center did a
study on church endorsement of candidates for political office.20 8
The results are revealing. When asked if churches should endorse
one candidate over another, the Pew poll found that, in the total
population, 29% of those polled said "yes," but 66% said "no."
20 9
When the breakdown was by groups, the results are as follows:
among white Protestants, 29% said "yes," and 68% said "no."21°
Among white Protestant Evangelicals, 34% said "yes," and 64%
207. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4955 (2006).
208. Despite Pastors' Protest, Most Americans Are Wary of Church Involvement in Parti-






said "no."21' Among mainline Protestants, 23% said "yes," and 73%
said "no."22 Among African American Protestants, 36% said "yes,"
and 55% said "no."213 Among all Catholics, 30% said "yes" and 67%
said "no. Among white, non-Hispanic Catholics, 26% said "yes,"
and 70% said "no."21 5 Those are rather overwhelming numbers
from the flock-of whatever denomination-indicating that
preachers who do electioneering are working against their own
interests. Their people do not want to hear them.
In American Grace: How Religion Divides Us and Unites Us,216
one of the most well-researched studies of religion and politics in
recent years, the authors explain:
The politicization of religion has triggered a negative reaction
among some, mostly young Americans. They have pulled
away from religion precisely because they perceive it as an ex-
tension of partisan politics with which they do not agree.
They see religion tied up with conservative politics, and their
aversion to the latter has led them to reject the former.2 7
If more proof is needed of this phenomenon, an article by Dr.
William V. D'Antonio is helpful.2"8 A number of Catholic bishops
became active in the 2008 presidential election against Candidate
Barack Obama, ostensibly because he was "pro-abortion."2 9 They
actively indicated to their flocks that no practicing Catholic could
vote for Obama because of this.220 In surveys after the election
among voters in the cities where these bishops were politically
active, the Democratic ticket prevailed, anywhere from a low of
54-45% to a high of 78-22%.221 Although these numbers are not
broken down by the religion of the voter, the over-all Catholic vote
in the 2008 elections went for Obama, 54-45%,222 which was a
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Despite Pastors'Protest, supra note 208.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: How RELIGION
DIVIDES US AND UNITES US (2010).
217. Id. at 434.
218. William V. D'Antonio, Catholic Bishops and the Electoral Process in American Poli-
tics, in VOTING AND HOLINESS 50 (Nicholas P. Cafardi ed., 2012).
219. Id. at 54.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 90.




seven percentage point swing from 2004, when Catholic voters
went for Bush over Kerry by 52-47%.223 The Catholic bishop's
document, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship,224 which
is a non-partisan voter guide for Catholics,225 was only known to
sixteen percent of all Catholics in the 2008 election,226 which tends
to indicate that what the preachers say about elections is, by and
large, less relevant than what they may think it is. In other
words, most of the people in the pews do not want to hear about
politics from the pulpit, or from their preachers, and when they do
hear it, some very good evidence indicates that they ignore it. The
Pulpit Freedom Sunday initiative thus may, in its attempt to re-
store what the Alliance Defense Fund believes are the free exer-
cise rights and political influence of preachers, have the opposite
effect.
B. The Politically Divisive Effects of Religion
But one effect that it may have, or is already having, could be
even worse. As the famous philosopher and student of religion,
Martin E. Marty has written:
Yet religion, a force for ennobling life and giving it meaning,
can also be used to justify the ugliest of human ventures.
Crusaders and conquistadores, claiming to have read or heard
the word of God, find themselves righteous as they stab "infi-
dels." Both sides in holy wars regularly feel that they are act-
ing out a divine drama that finds God on their side.227
None of the major Abrahamic faiths is without its tendency to vio-
lence against those who are not counted among the true believers.
In the Jewish Scriptures, in the Book of Deuteronomy, the Lord
says:
223. Mark Silk & Andrew Walsh, A Past Without a Future, AMERICA (Nov. 3, 2008),
http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?articleid=11
1 81 .
224. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizen-
ship (2011).
225. Churches are allowed to publish truly non-partisan voter guides, and that is not
considered to be electioneering. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 2, at 12-13.
226. MARK M. GRAY, CARA CATHOLIC POLL 2011: FORDHAM CENTER ON RELIGION AND
CULTURE QUESTIONS 3 (2011).




If there is found among you, in one of your towns that the
Lord your God is giving you, a man or a woman who does
what is evil in the sight of the Lord your God, and trans-
gresses his covenant by going to serve other gods and wor-
shiping them ... then you shall bring out to your gates that
man or woman who has committed this crime and you shall
stone the man or woman to death.228
Even Jesus of Nazareth said, "[d]o not think that I come to bring
peace to the earth. I have not come to bring peace, but a sword."229
Most Christians forget that Jesus had the apostles bring swords to
the Garden of Gethsemane on the night he was arrested.3 ° And
Marty's comments, quoted above, about the crusades and conquis-
tadores are, of course, out of Christian history. One of history's
most infamous quotes occurred during the Catholic crusade
against the Albigensians, when the crusading troops were about to
attack Beziers, a town where there were known to be both Al-
bigensian "heretics" and "faithful" Catholics- "[m]assacre them
for the Lord knows his own," advised Arnaud Amaury, the Abbot
of Citeaux.231 And if we would look for a modern Christian state-
ment of hatred for those who do not have the "truth," one need
only look to the Westboro Baptist Church.
Islam has given rise to similar dicta. "Slay [unbelievers] wher-
ever you find them. Drive them out from the places from which
they drove you."22 And "[s]ay to the unbelievers, 'You shall be
overthrown and driven into Hell-an evil resting place!"'2 2 And
"[hie that denies God's revelations should know that swift is God's
reckoning."234 And "[w]e suddenly smote them [i.e., the unbeliev-
228. Deuteronomy 17:2-5 (New Revised Standard Version). On the other hand, Hillel the
Elder, one of the sources for modern, rabbinic Judaism, taught, "[wihat is hateful to you, do
not do to your fellow: this is the whole Torah; the rest is explanation; go and learn." Shab-
bat 31a.
229. Matthew 10:34 (New Revised Standard Version).
230. Luke 22:38 (New Revised Standard Version). To be fair, he also said, "[1ove your
enemies, do good to those who hate you." Luke 6:27 (New Revised Standard Edition). The
question is which part of his message his followers hear, and some Christians can be very
selective, e.g., the Westboro Baptist Church.
231. Malcolm Lambert, THE CATHARS 103 (1998) (quoting DIALOGUS MIRACULORUM






ers] and they were plunged into utter despair. Thus were the evil-
doers annihilated. Praise be to God, Lord of the Universe!"
23 5
As noted above, the list of 359 churches participating in Pulpit
Freedom Sunday in 2011 did not include any synagogues or
mosques. What if the list of those "churches" seeking to evade the
Tax Code's prohibition on electioneering was not predominantly a
Christian one? What if the majority of them were mosques?
Would the reaction be the same? In this primarily Christian coun-
try, would we expect the IRS to be so tolerant of their "rights"?
Would the Alliance Defense Fund be there to defend them?
C. "0, Felix Culpa"
Faith is a powerful motivation, for good and for ill. Its mixture
with politics can be toxic. Jefferson, a staunch defender of reli-
gious liberty, knew this, which is why he talked of the "wall of
separation." In 1800, he wrote to Jeremiah Moor, "itlhe clergy, by
getting themselves established by law and ingrafted into the ma-
chine of government, have been a very formidable engine against
the civil and religious rights of man."236 And in a letter to Baron
Von Humboldt in 1813, he said, "[hlistory, I believe, furnishes no
example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil govern-
ment. This marks the lowest grade of ignorance of which their
civil as well as religious leaders will always avail themselves for
their own purposes."237
And while Jefferson may have been the first to use the phrase
"separation of church and state" in his letter to the Danbury Bap-
tists, 238 Madison also used a similar phrase, speaking specifically
of the U.S. Constitution: "[sitrongly guarded as is the separation
between Religion and Government in the Constitution of the
United States, the danger of encroachment by Ecclesiastical Bod-
ies, may be illustrated by precedents already furnished in their
short history."239
235. Koran 6:44-45. Muslim scholars today would say that these verses only authorize
defensive actions. See RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW 1313 (2011).
236. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jeremiah Moor (Aug. 1800), in THE JEFFERSONIAN
CYCLOPEDIA 146 (John P. Foley ed., 1900).
237. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron Von Humboldt (Dec. 1813), in THE
JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 236, at 827.
238. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-64 (1878) (citations omitted).
239. James Madison, Monopolies, Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments,
128 HARPER'S MAG. 489,492 (1914).
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Of course, we know that Jefferson was not at the Constitutional
Convention, but James Madison was. They were both founding
members of the same political party, then called the Democratic-
Republican party-a counter-weight to the much more establish-
ment-prone Federalists. 4 ' Madison, who did help to draft the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, had views similar to Jeffer-
son's on the mix of religion and politics. In his A Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments opposing legislation
that would create an established church for the Commonwealth of
Virginia, he wrote:
In some instances [clergy] have been seen to erect a spiritual
tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances
they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyr-
anny; in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the
liberties of the people. Rulers who wished to subvert the pub-
lic liberty, may have found an established Clergy convenient
auxiliaries.24'
In the Federalist Papers arguing for the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, Madison wrote of religiously based factionalism:
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of
man; and we see them everywhere brought into different de-
grees of activity, according to the different circumstances of
civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion,
concerning government and many other points . . . have, in
turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mu-
tual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex
and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common
good. 242
Strong words by men with strong opinions, perhaps, but they
make a point: Americans, from our founding, have not wanted our
preachers or our churches meddling in our politics. Although it
may have been a happenstance that Lyndon Johnson's 1954
amendment caught the churches in the electioneering prohibition,
it has redounded to America's benefit. It is a major reason why
240. WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS, POLITICAL PARTIES IN A NEW NATION: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE, 1776-1809 at 81-98 (1963).
241. JAMES MADISON, Petition of James Madison to the Virginia General Assembly (June
20, 1875), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 21, 24-25 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2006).
242. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 53-54 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1892).
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Washington, D.C. has not become a Beirut or a Cairo, with reli-
gious violence in the streets. It has also redounded to the preach-
ers' and the churches' benefit. It keeps them on message. It keeps
them among those "beneficial and stabilizing influences in com-
munity life"243 that merit the support of a public subsidy. Jeffer-
son's wall does this. That wall is reinforced by our Tax Code. We
should all, preachers included, consider that a felix culpa.
243. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
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